

9 Dec 77

JFK — "middle course"

He believed he could keep it under control — to a degree he did — till he died!

LBJ — same!

Kennedy did — did not (till he left office) sooner than he planned — like JFK (and N!)

LBJ + N for VN!

(JFK? I don't think so!)

(N lost in '60 — in (small) part

for "losing Cuba." See debate!

(He wanted invasion before election! If it had...?!)

BUT — Prior for JFK + LBJ of avoiding military revolt / migration — leads to right —

was (a) statements of great stakes
strong control
readiness + preparations
to escalate

(b) drift upwards — beyond (at least for LBJ) what he hoped for, planned, expected

they not show what military had estimated, signalled, would (vs. Kadi
Schles,
(Halbroth?)
McGowan

If LBJ had had 2d terms,
or even come back in 1968, what?

ESC! (It would have failed totally for NVN —

failed to:

- 1) stop war in SVN (did they care?)
- 2) avert invasion
and begin bombing

Mil. "think" is wrong —

can they really be this stupid?
reckless? heedless?
unconcern for China
withless / brutal?
(were they prepared to back Khrushchev (1945) approach?
or "Serbia / Yugoslavia"?)

(My hunch: Ciro never convinced (McN, LBJ, + well as Bell)
big bombing would fail — as well as sacrifice
collaboration (the best hopes for thinks)
and being in China

McN: 2) If we win in $1\frac{1}{2}$ years (end '66 - mid-67)
"No loss" I'm a hero — LBJ has averted failure
win win [or if: SVN is quit in 1967-68]
it was —

(6) If we lose gamblers:

- 1) Hanoi won't talk, or concede
- 2) "don't back off: reinforce, attacks"
- 3) "NVA don't go to "Phase II"

fight to perilla over
the McN is needed to hold down (hopless,
dangerous, reinvigorated escalation, pursued
by Mil, Right, Public

lie to the, "our strategy
is working" — by '67
(opposite of his wins) —
driving VCS to unre-
signation, "coup"

June 00

Palm:

quote his War College study of 1950-51

me and "Old Ben Poo"

Palm: give him Aug 28⁶⁵ draft
+ Amherst?

Sign West book

Check returning book - Palm?
(Halbrook, et al)

Tape recorder / batteries
tapes

Look up: AOL? my original notes on
decision of 1965 ("Ball"):

My hyp. (then, & now):

ON WHY DON'T VCS ever say "What you're
doing [MCN/West] won't work" :

- (a) That won't "unanimous position"
[WITH WESTY]

(b) for some reason that UB reports,
falsely, "unanimous" with VCS/West to
Congress & public (despite actual says,
"There are those who say..." (as in
compar '64 - not admitting that some of
"those" are high in his Admin (the VCS,
even if they don't all fully agree).

- To reveal difference of opinion
(among advisors, those with access to class. info
(+ experience - e.g. of dom. pol. - and with authority)

IS TO GIVE A CHOICE - THE CHOICE - TO: Pres (who
needs a choice anyway? Can't be confined to "options" given

JCS lie to Pres, and let he lie about them to public,
for same reason he lies to public (NOT? to them?)
or also to them:
or to Congress/public — "I may do D later"

who may brink (not just a different option —
they will & do, anyway) but "the wrong one
for Pres, "getting out" or "escalate / ^B risk
of war with China" vs. JCS D,
_{non-W. ref}

~~verses~~

for Congress or public: A or D (VCS)

Both Pres and VCS prefer C - McN's ^{West's} etc.
statement (which postpones A / failure + "keeps the hope alive"
^{of D} to risk of "A now" or, for Pres, "D now".

Why do they settle on West?

rather than ~~the~~ Palmer/Vann:

Whelan expects to get mobilization after
of march 400-450,000 — the VCS plan
(large war, including Laos — Palmer has and this
(+ I Corps) + southern NVN

(What did Palmer think of this? → risk of
war w. China; end of China → mess?)

HKJ — "confront China" (wrong what?

or "step out"

i.e. "accept loss of SEA" ?!

That's what "VCS" — i.e. HKJ — said, always!
[like apparently, in Cuba II, "Pres will have
to order (a) 2-4 air strikes, (b) US air support
(plus) to avoid failure."

That was the same VCS.

Or — mess is mess — give us answer
(If he had not to say that to Pres — "It's
essential, or my name to be."

(If did tell him: "500K, 5 yrs"

[Why did Taylor (!) ever say, "less" ?]

COPENHAGEN/A-Bomb


VN 5 Jan 2000

[NUC WAR WITH
CHINA
NEW HYP]

Note: no military counterpart to Ball,
Clifford, WPB '64...H³/Hughes (CIA/Hughes)
putting in writing the judgments
that pointed toward negotiating,
not sending troops [actually, Taylor
getting as Andrews!]

not even orally, in JCS' meetings
with Pres:

(Should? as CMC?)



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Comp. II TG-34A-1964 Confession

Comp III leaving, kiss:

Delegation

Cuba II + Stand:

(NATO: SU OB - hyped up as much as

NVA/NLF OB was hyped down!

(I didn't know: Monroe or role of Test. debt I did see draft cable on disarming also, SU ministers! Map/Brian/Offutt:

(Questions for Kilpatrick)
on JSCP

NSSM-1

325 million?

VN $\approx$ NUC ARMS RACE

* oct 7, 2000

In both VN + news, I accepted a "Kissed" and for a Pres who would sit on VCS and the proposed proposals

("Moderate Came to the Abyss")

at cost of Pres (+ Sec Def)

to keep the fun
reality, going public with the proposals and the opposition to his (which ought have been better: but right have been worse, a coin for them. I was, a gambler; maybe OK for S-R, for buying time - but time was not well used, and instead favored this course.

- adopting a course that compromised with VCS, giving the part of what they wanted;
- Concealing what he was doing (giving them), concealing both the concealing this recommendations, claiming he had their support, concealing both the difference of his policy from this and the degree of similarity.
- Hiding the risks of his policy
- Over-estimating its promise

I have latter aspects of Pres'

choices made his course, at best, a Known Evil, a "Moderate Road to Oblivion"

(His, & McN's, personal prefs - on news, if not VN - were good, not just Known Evil But even on news, entering on VN

there was a much, much better course

to follow, in absence of abolition / Withdrawal ("peace")
Min Det (1/11) Min Det (1/11) Min Det (1/11)

*

1. (?) ^{Sen. VFR} ^{VP.} RN vs. (RN) = 1951-53 (RN '53 trip: 63
 outpost of freedom 64-65
 LBJ vs. N in 54
 + JFR vs N in 51-54
 not JFR vs. N/LBJ in late '61,

2. CWarrior.

Delegation (continued in
 also in 1961 - BSAP, BNSP (1959-60)
 C3 (

Berlin '48 PR.D. 62 (from '52-'53.
 (1954 Orals)

50 - Korra (53 (Nues)) USMC - Dinkelhor (RN)
 (Barbar)

other CWarrior: Hunt, Colson
 Khatulana

bst 1950

(RN behind the attack Korra in '53 with
 new threat; he favored Nues in Indonesia in '54,
 as did HAK (Admiral)
and troops

CBV, Russell, Redgum (see Bennett '67; Cambridge '70)

[Stamp: at USMC] (later

Dabek: "not without allies"; A-bomb

Korra: (Nues again without Nues): N

Sunday Nov 26th 2000

The Santa

The VCS were pressing for a crazy strategy,
with considerable risk of war with China.

L.E. ? WWR, WPB, and McNamara were pressing for
an ^{almost} equally hopeless and wrong strategy —
likely to move into VCS eventually
(by June 65 — moving slower than
I expected — more civ. control...

both aimed at getting Ho to quit:

withdraw support

cut his support / destroy cap.

call off NLF (can offset)

at least, if Cons could be stopped: priority?

see page:

I hated strat. bombing* or is S-F → temporarily
and torture, terror calling off (C/K)
above all, war* vs. INR

(This separated me from American public,
which I didn't trust to reject S.B.)

I was sympathetic to US mil., esp. infantry.
(+ Marines), (Airborne, S.F. ...) + close air support
air defense / too air

* Ironically, I worked on Ave plans, doctrine, for SAC
(behind is determine: SAC, Polaris)

I distrusted, disliked, feared Cons
glad to fight them, (hated Con system = fascist
or help others

I didn't want to "lose" — esp. "mil. defeat,"
after US commitment (RT)
which I had opposed

yet, I had facilitated it
Now WG ("knew" for C?)
Feb 10, Qui Nhon

My image of CBJ:

for VTM/MCN

Sept 18
Bin Hoa
Brinks

I sum: he had accepted in principle
(or, not rejected — posthumous decision)
for fall: a) no much
b) half skeptical, reluctant.

TG as done of thrust

(like Cambodian hunting, invasion, for N.?)
+ ...

[Test for money
loyalty
discretion

you ability to dissemble,
in front of 1) boss
and 2) others,

Frequent

colleagues who

willing to lie
mislead, even to
friends

didn't know
(knew in 1st?)
mistakes
press

show no answers,
give no hints,

don't visibly curious

of manner

seemed
probe

(see piakos
spouse)

hyp. generation

ability to conduct
affairs in "monog."

speculation on
disant...

manage w. piakos spouse

HN was chaotic

no "gov"

no legitimacy, support (corruption)

clowns, cowboys
(Key)

(not stupid...)

EGL - this gov can't win HAM

("Khinh camp" EGL :

USG plan of "neutralism", negotiation, coalition

Alternatives

(Russell's + ROK "solution")

Not just (Ball): "critique, blame them,
pull out" (for

Not new GVN: allow it

(e.g. - 1967 election! Ky vs. T

to US MINH (Wf does Chan my no?
No wanted?)

Buddhists? "Broad gov"

Not a coalition negot w. NLF

Call is French!

Wf was NLF so

anti-French?

Give it back!

and OK!

(Can't help of SU...)

Part Ball in charge; + H³, ^{Senate} does...

Make the responsible (after 1964)

find wild allies below VCS...

I was used to crazy policies,
esp. of VCS:

SIOP

"Mad dogs"

By of Pigs
JSCP; 325M

(100% in current note)

Nitzsche: makers of groups

NATO FU

+ vetters

MLF

(not, Korea - is same way
Berlin defense, in principle (but: of FU? no)
1961?)

My focus on unending,

Election, election/politics

(Goldwater: SC superior

Delegation

More war

I saw

I knew: current

1960

month 1960

but some basic policy in VN
(VCS form)

I was used to crazy policies,
esp. of VCS:

SIOP

"Mad dogs"

By of Pigs
JSCP; 325M

(10% in Current)*
Nixon

Nitzsche: madness of groups

NATO FU

+ vetoes

MLF

(not, Korea - is same way
Berlin defense, is principle (but: of FU? no)
1961?)

My focus on uncertainty,

Election, election/politics

I knew: Current

(Goldwater: SC superior

1960

Delegation

Minister

There was

I saw

but some basic policy in VN

(VCS form)

27 Nov 00

OF TRUTHS THAT

LBV didn't get a landslide because he
was "less likely" to lose in VN in Feb 65
than Goldwater, or didn't deserve

^{etc}
(This was true;
+ reason to vote for him;
as, why I vote for Hou, on
ABM + S.C.

(no landslide!)

vs. Nader

If that truth had been debated (unlike ABM!)

But still

S.C., abortion)

result ^{etc} didn't not mean down him
"more democratic, Const., decent, and longer and
more strongly supported

(No advantage! Prob. would
have been bigger:

"Was or Not Out -

If support for doing it -

Advantage (for me) for openness and debate
would have been not that loss would have
been more likely to reverse

("Unity")

Substant

Longer

Bigger - less restricted

"let us in"

It wouldn't have been:

But that it would have been less likely;
more chance of averting it

for its brutality, costs, cost-benefit, immorality,
illegality, crayons: unlikelihood of success
(see Bobi speech at Think-in Mount in Feb 65
when it did start: more app. to bury (- young) than (4)

This was another reason for LBJ to avoid
debate (even if no budget competition
with Hunt here — as, after Feb '66!)

~~Too late for debate~~

Did LBJ see this?

Did Ball, et al & Senate doves think of
debate — to oppose policy of a Dem Pres?
I think not!

|| (What would they have done if
Repub — N, Rock, G — had been Pres in
1964 (as N could have been!) or 65 (G,
Rock)

|| Would they, "as Cold Warriors" (Chomsky!)
have boasted etc, with moderate or full?!
(Would Chomsky, Aiken, ...?)

|| Because they were hopeful? Archie? Some NO
"unacceptability" of loss (McG in office; McN; Rock; WWR; JCS)
Unfortunately, Dem LBJ = N (if not G!)

|| not JFK, H³, McG, RFK (1966 on)
or Dem doves

|| What would these have said if they had left
in 1963, with JFK's death via RFK?
(Hoodin)

and were 1) no longer "responsible" personally
2) no longer under a Democratic (Pres) higher

NO (Did JFK even say: "I won't be the first Pres
to lose a war — lose VN — see SEA go like China?")

LBJ (McG, McN) did not want to follow in steps
the bst who did not intervene to avoid
loss of China

(or Carter, in Mélanges ?
but Elhal: like Korea,)

nor the bst who brought China into Korea,
by backing MacArthur

but was willing to follow bst who went
into Korea, despite warnings (x clear risks: ^{China, over}
(I applauded at the time — 1950
appon aggression
been long!

and applauded "limited war" ^{appon}
no arms (I thought)
no war w. China
and Eisenhower!

but doubts later: now!

(Best: Dewey wins [Schles, NYT this week: ²⁰⁰⁰ Nov 26]
loses China (no int.), doesn't intervene in
Korea (Taft? — and no NATO building
no McCarthy

Dulles:
Korea?
China?

(SU A-bomb, Fuchs, Hiss, China: McC arguing?, to blame
Dewey, lost the in '52?) (No Robert fringe for
this — to Taft?)

they collaboratively with a presenting
a false set of options, choice to create,
as almost all choices (inc. LB).

public behavior) = Present policy for foreseeable
future (maybe, a year; not, 6 months,
or 3 from Nov 3!)

(compare 1916, 1940: did Pan feel confident
he could hold power neutrality for a year after
election? (FOR: 13 months)

(N in 1972: person more being - of Hawaii
and indef. being asked!)
"power is at hand")

Whereas all friends saw time choice

6 initial debate and reality of his preferred
choice - Win State (I don't, not just USMC/USAF)
(CNO?)
(he said so, in Feb:!) } did with
(so did John } believe the
last?

?

But not compared to

- 1) realities of situation, the
- 2) real alternatives (in eyes of friends,
and realities

(except for Rock?

3) Withdrawal - (which I was

EGC/Don...)

3) Moderate Esc / unhappy and - how down to J)

This debate if would not have lost of a
handshake!

But to prove that, G and JCS

1) Revealed realities

2) Revealed real feasible alternatives

a. 3) against Pres' wishes: Call Pres a liar,
prove it (with docs)

G: Who would have believed in '71

would be called Traitors

Wreckers

"Spin"

like me in '71

Films

if would us, = UCONI

Comp-plots

like N in '71!

|| If would not have been unhappy with y
revolution in fall 1964!

if the domestic public would ^{or} endorse this policy: some chance

unless prompt to sign the proposal to
get Pres to endorse the approach, seriously

prob. LB opposed X X X

(much less likely) if the resulted

+ the course one over

(time in 1965,
1967 too)

(What happened to "Admirals, after Bullt?
but - see Tylor.

and 2) after public debate

(Could it have gotten LB 1) to lose - no: vs. G (vs. Rock, or N
because of LIES 2) proposed yes!

But because of LIES: black policy, major (moment! But no
"no decision"

to, "refunder" vs. G Win policy wasn't
"fair, realistic"

(Against ~~quit~~ it was LBJ's:
which public would probably have
endured, not certainly
+ certainly not all, or 61%
for LBJ)

But a realistic debate — against
LBJ or JSC, for Withdrawal, or keep-trying-
but-withdraw
with the doc
(VFC in 1961-64)

would have produced much support for
Withdrawal (or ...) — working with LBJ or JCS
which JCS with senior + less
LBJ nor JCS wanted; being

so they allowed themselves to lose
debate on Win, and lose G (not with
chance of going) hoping to win internal debate
on Win later: on its merits and the outcome
(and then to resign — some power, though not
as much as if they had been more willing!)

CBV's "stealth" approach ("fencing")

1) Not a landslide > FDR 1936!

Not only ²⁾ to protect Great Soc

He had to paint G as an extremist — an unus + VX

he couldn't do that if he revealed

— the advice of his own VCS (= G)

— and his aim: moderate real

— or, the fragility ^{reality} of the boyan regime

(would rationalise with Soc or

— then that the "status quo policy be withdrawn

capitalised on would be — which public

overwhelmingly endorsed no. "for North + draft's books"

Pres wanted to

no strong pressure for

withdrawal during

Campaign —

Excerpt Marshall, Russell

FC: He was no

"bonny pacifist":

1) posthumous decision

but he rejected

2) encourage VCS to help

RT "at this time"

3) encourage Khand to help

Laotian aid, for

4) intimidate Hanoi, if possible

3 more months!

(He had not decided;

(present the commitment: failure

of "det"

but his advice were working

on him, and expected to prevail: "What's your alternative?"

in Aug 64

What else to boyan with? (not, troops)

and Feb 65

VC had a bottom

If withdrawal were an

line, prior to

alternative, really "possible"

boyaning

then it immediately lowered any attractiveness.

coalition

(denotation?)
GUN in?

US out

(how fast?)

unif (eventually)

(land reform?)
NO

[Wf did Taylor disagree with VCS

on boyaning strategy — aiming at a Win?

- (Is it worth the cost?)

What was he up to?

Opposing troops

— and "Phu Yen"

— yet predicting victory

— soon!

DEFENSIVE, FOR NLF?

nothing was obligated seem
from Catho/US/GUN

Asst (downs): "What might you have done with

more prospect of effectiveness — some realistic hope

of effort. — if you had 1) cast off ^{(2) SOME} all conviction of
future cooperation relations? effectiveness?